Reblog: A Closer Look at the Kerry-Lieberman Cap-and-Trade Proposal

by mpabst - May 18, 2010

Robert Stavins, a professor of business and government at Harvard,�thinks harder about climate legislation than almost anyone out there. Thus, his new analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman�American Power Act should be required reading, particularly in light of . (Not true, Stavins writes below. Between 2012 and 2050, only 18 percent of the allowance value will accrue to industry). His post is below�and .

(), passed by the House of Representatives last June, there is now some confusing commentary in the press and blogosphere about the allocation of allowances in the new Senate proposal � the � sponsored by , Democrat of Massachusetts, and , Independent of Connecticut.� As before, the mistake is being made of that is, who ultimately benefits from the allocation and auction revenue.���

In this essay, I assess quantitatively the actual incidence of the allowance value in the new Senate proposal, much as .� I find (as with Waxman-Markey) that the lion�s share of the allowance value � some 82% � goes to consumers and public purposes, and only 18% accrues to covered, private industry. � First, however, I place this in context by commenting briefly on the overall Senate proposal, and by examining in generic terms the effects that allowance allocations have � and do not have � in cap-and-trade systems.���

The American Power Act of 2010

You may be wondering why I am bothering to write about the Kerry-Lieberman proposal at all, given the conventional wisdom that the likelihood is very small of achieving the 60 votes necessary in the Senate to pass the legislation (particularly with the withdrawal of Senator Lindsey Graham � Republican of South Carolina � from the former triplet of Senate sponsors).� Two reasons.� First, (although I must say that the vote count on Kerry-Lieberman does not look good, with the current tally according to Environment & Energy Daily being 26 Yes, 11 Probably Yes, 31 Fence Sitters, 10 Probably No, and 22 No).� Second, if the conventional wisdom turns out to be correct, and the 60-vote margin proves insurmountable in the current Congress, then when the Congress returns to this issue � which it inevitably will in the future� � among the key starting points for Congressional thinking will be the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman proposals.� Hence, the design issues do matter.���

The American Power Act, like its House counter-part, is a long and complex piece of legislation with many design elements in its cap-and-trade system (which, of course, is not called �cap-and-trade� � but rather �reduction and investment�), and many elements that go well beyond the cap-and-trade system (sorry, I meant to say the �reduce-and-invest� system).� Perhaps in a future essay, I will examine some of those other elements (wherein there is naturally both good news and bad news), but for today, I am focusing exclusively on the allowance allocation issue, which is of central political importance.�

Before turning to an empirical examination of the Kerry-Lieberman allowance allocation, it may be helpful to recall some generic facts about the role that allowance allocations play in cap-and-trade systems.���

The Role of Allowance Allocations in Cap-and-Trade Systems

It is exceptionally important to keep in mind what is probably the key attribute of cap-and-trade systems:� the particular allocation of those allowances which are freely distributed has no impact on the equilibrium distribution of allowances (after trading), and therefore no impact on the allocation of emissions (or emissions abatement), the total magnitude of emissions, or the aggregate social costs.� (, about which more below.)� By the way, this independence of a cap-and-trade system�s performance from the initial allowance allocation was established as far back as 1972 by in a in the (based upon his 1971 Ph.D. dissertation). It has been validated with repeatedly over the years.�

Generally speaking, the choice between auctioning and freely allocating allowances does not influence firms� production and emission reduction decisions (although it�s true that the revenue from auctioned allowances can be used for a variety of public purposes, including cutting distortionary taxes, which can thereby reduce the net cost of the program).� Firms face the same emissions cost regardless of the allocation method.� When using an allowance, whether it was received for free or purchased, a firm loses the opportunity to sell that allowance, and thereby recognizes this �opportunity cost� in deciding whether to use the allowance.� Consequently, the allocation choice will not � for the most part � influence a cap�s overall costs.���

Manifest political pressures lead to different initial allocations of allowances, which affect distribution, but not environmental effectiveness, and not cost-effectiveness.� This means that ordinary political pressures need not get in the way of developing and implementing a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic policy.�� With other policy instruments � both in the environmental realm and in other policy domains � political pressures often reduce the effectiveness and/or increase the cost of well-intentioned public policies.� Cap-and-trade provides natural protection from this.� Distributional battles over the allowance allocation in a cap-and-trade system do not raise the overall cost of the program nor affect its environmental impacts.���

In fact, the political process of states, districts, sectors, firms, and interest groups fighting for their share of the pie (free allowance allocations) serves as the , but without detrimental effects to the system�s environmental or economic performance.� That�s the good news, and it should never be forgotten.�

But, depending upon the specific allocation mechanisms employed, there are several ways that the choice to freely distribute allowances can affect a system�s cost.� Here�s where the caveats come in.���

Some Important Caveats

First, as I said above, auction revenue may be used in ways that .� Free allocations forego such opportunities.�

Second, some proposals to freely allocate allowances to electric utilities may affect electricity prices, and thereby affect the extent to which contributes to limiting emissions cost-effectively.� Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman both allocate a significant number of allowances to local (electricity) distribution companies, which are subject to cost-of-service regulation even in regions with restructured wholesale electricity markets.� Because the distribution companies are subject to cost-of-service regulation, the benefit of the allocation will ultimately accrue to electricity consumers, not the companies themselves.� While these allocations could increase the overall cost of the program if the economic value of the allowances is passed on to consumers in the form of reduced electricity prices, if that value is instead passed on to consumers through lump-sum rebates, the effect can be to compensate consumers for increased electricity prices without reducing incentives for energy conservation.� (There are some legitimate behavioral questions here about how consumers will respond to such rebates; these questions are best left to ongoing economic research.)���

Third, can be useful for , but these allocations can provide perverse incentives and drive up the costs of achieving a cap if they are poorly designed.� This merits some explanation.�

An output-based updating allocation ties the quantity of allowances that a firm receives to its output (production).� Such an allocation is essentially a production subsidy.� While this affects firms� pricing and production decisions in ways that can, in some cases, introduce unintended consequences and increase the cost of meeting an emissions target, when applied to energy-intensive trade-exposed industries, the incentives created by such allocations can contribute to the goal of reducing emission leakage abroad.���

This approach is probably superior to an , whereby imports of a small set of specific commodities must carry with them CO2 allowances, because import allowance requirements can damage international trade relations.� The only real solution to the competitiveness issue is to bring key non-participating countries within an international climate regime in meaningful ways, an obviously difficult objective to achieve.� (On this, please see the work of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements.)�

Is the Kerry-Lieberman Allowance Allocation a Corporate Give-Away?

Perhaps unintentionally, there has been some potentially misleading coverage on this issue.� At first glance, about half of the allowances would be auctioned and about half freely allocated over the life of the program, 2012-2050.� (In the early years, the auction share is smaller, reflecting various transitional allocations that phase out over time.)� But looking at the shares that are auctioned and freely allocated can be very misleading.���

Instead, the best way to assess the real implications is not as �free allocation� versus �auction,� but rather in terms of who is the ultimate beneficiary of each element of the allocation and auction, that is, how the value of the allowances and auction revenue are allocated.� On closer inspection, it turns out that many of the elements of the apparently free allocation accrue to consumers and public purposes, not private industry.� Indeed, my conclusion is that over the period 2012-2050, less than 18% of the allowance value accrues to industry.��


One Response to “Reblog: A Closer Look at the Kerry-Lieberman Cap-and-Trade Proposal”

  1. [...] provision. The Senate version drafted by Sens. John Kerry (D-Mass.) and Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.) also has one, and just last week the much awaited Environmental Protection Agency analysis of the bill concluded [...]

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